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ABSTRACT
This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian
reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust
dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees, while leaving dismissal costs unchanged for bigger
firms, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in dismissal costs
decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to big firms, especially in sectors
with higher employment volatility. Moreover, we find that the reform reduced firms' employment















Theory makes clear-cut predictions on the eﬀects of employment protection on
labour reallocation (see, e.g., Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)).
While a number of cross-country studies examine the impact of dismissal costs on
aggregate and sectoral employment adjustments, there are few empirical studies
on the impact of dismissal costs on worker and job ﬂows using individual and ﬁrm
level data. Moreover, studies using micro-data often focus on the internal mar-
gin of adjustment, and often ignore adjustments on the external margin through
entry and exit.
In this paper, we use an Italian employer-employee panel to examine the eﬀect
of dismissal costs on worker and job ﬂows. Italy is an interesting country to study
this issue because it is one of the strictest countries in terms of employment pro-
tection legislation. More importantly, in 1990 Italy introduced a labour market
reform which increased employment protection for workers employed under per-
manent contracts in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees relative to those in ﬁrms
with more than 15 employees. We exploit the diﬀerential increase in the costs of
unfair dismissals in small relative to large ﬁrms after 1990 to study the impact
of dismissal costs on labour ﬂows. We use a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach
by comparing worker and job ﬂows in small and large ﬁrms before and after the
reform.
Our empirical analysis uses administrative data from the Italian Social Secu-
rity Institute (INPS). Our data set is an employer-employee panel, which includes
information on: dates of appointment and separation of the worker; dates of incor-
poration and termination of the ﬁrm, and the yearly average number of employ-
ees. We use these data to examine worker ﬂows (i.e., accessions and separations),
and job ﬂows on the internal and external margin (i.e., employment changes and
entry and exit). We ﬁnd that accessions and separations decreased after the re-
form by about 10% for both men and women in small relative to large ﬁrms, and
the results are robust to the inclusion of sector and region eﬀects, sector-speciﬁc
trends, sectoral productivity, and size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects. Moreover, we ﬁnd
evidence of a bigger eﬀect of the reform in previously more volatile sectors.
Consistent with smaller worker ﬂows after the reform, we also ﬁnd employ-
ment changes fell by about 15% in small relative to big ﬁrms after the reform.
Moreover, we examine the impact of dismissal costs on ﬁrms’ external margins
of adjustment. In particular, we ﬁnd that small ﬁrms are less likely to enter the
market after the reform compared to large ﬁrms. By contrast, small ﬁrms are
more likely to exit the market after the reform compared to large ﬁrms, which is
consistent with ﬁrms’ attempts to circumvent the legislation given that closing
ﬁrms are not responsible for unjust dismissal payments. Moreover, as for worker
ﬂows, we ﬁnd that these eﬀects tend to be larger in more volatile sectors.
A number of previous studies have exploited the variation across ﬁrms in
2employment protection legislation within Italy.1 Boeri and Jimeno (2003) assess
the eﬀect of employment protection on lay-oﬀ probabilities by comparing small
and large ﬁrms, though they do not exploit the temporal change in the legisla-
tion. Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2002), and Schivardi and Torrini (2004)
evaluate the eﬀects of employment protection on the size distribution of Italian
ﬁrms, by looking at the probability of adjustments in size for ﬁrms around the
ﬁfteen employee threshold. These three papers identify the eﬀect of employment
protection by exploiting the fact that, in Italy, ﬁrms with less than 15 employees
are subject to lower dismissal costs than ﬁrms with more than 15 employees.This
amounts to capturing the eﬀect of interest by comparing the performance of small
and large ﬁrms. Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2002) also present some results
exploiting the temporal variation in employment protection, but their sole focus
is on the eﬀect of employment protection on ﬁrm size and they do not control for
size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects in their analysis.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution
of dismissal costs in Italy. Section 3 explains the identiﬁcation strategy used to
evaluate the impact of dismissal costs in Italy. Section 4 describes the Social
Security data and presents estimates of the eﬀects of the rise in dismissal costs
on worker and job ﬂows in Italy.
2 Employment Protection Regulations in Italy
Italy, together with the other Southern European countries, is considered one of
the strictest countries in terms of employment protection legislation (EPL). For
example, a study by Lazear (1990) for the period 1956-84 and a study by Bertola
(1990) for the late 1980s rank Italy as the strictest country in terms of EPL. A
study by the OECD’s Employment Outlook for the late 1980s, ranks Portugal
as the strictest country followed by Italy, Spain, and Greece. A similar study
by the OECD’s Employment Outlook for the late 1990s, which includes Turkey,
North America, and transition economies as well, continues to rank Portugal
as the strictest, followed by Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain. The study by
Nicoletti et al. (2000), which does not include some of the countries in the
OECD’s Employment Outlook study, also ranks Italy third, after Portugal and
the Netherlands, in terms of the strictness of regulations on permanent contracts.
Dismissals were ﬁrst regulated in Italy in 1966 through Law No. 604, which
established that, in case of unfair dismissal, employers had the choice to either
hire back workers or pay a dismissal cost, which depended on tenure and ﬁrm
1Ichino and Riphahn (2004) exploits the within ﬁrm variation.
2Other studies exploiting within-country variation to examine the eﬀect of dismissal costs on
labour reallocation include: Kugler (1999); Hunt (2000); Oyer and Schaeﬀer (2000); Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001); Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003); Autor (2003); Autor, Donohue III
and Schwab (2004), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004), Kugler and Pica (2004); and Friesen (2005).
3size. Payments for unfair dismissals ranged between 5 and 8 months for workers
with less than two and a half years of tenure; between 5 and 12 months for those
between two and a half and 20 years of tenure; and between 5 and 14 months for
workers with more than 20 years of tenure in ﬁrms with more than 60 employees.3
Firms with less than 60 employees had to pay half the amount paid by ﬁrms with
more than 60 employees, and ﬁrms with less than 35 workers were completely
exempt.
In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law No. 300) established that all ﬁrms
with more than 15 employees had to hire back workers and pay their foregone
wages in case of unfair dismissals. Firms with less than 15 employees, however,
remained exempt.4 A number of recent studies show evidence of the binding eﬀect
of this law for ﬁrms at the 15 employee threshold. For example, the last annual
report by the Italian Statistical Oﬃce, ISTAT, shows a larger fraction transiting
to a smaller size category for ﬁrms around the 15 employee threshold than for
ﬁrms at any other sizes. Similarly, Garibaldi, Pacelli and Borgarello (2003) and
Schivardi and Torrini (2004) ﬁnd a (slightly) higher probability of inaction and
a higher probability of reducing ﬁrm size than of increasing it for ﬁrms at the 15
employee threshold.
Given the high costs of unfair dismissals for larger ﬁrms, in 1987 the Italian
government liberalized the use of temporary contracts in an attempt to provide
more ﬂexibility to employers. Prior to 1987, temporary contracts could be used for
speciﬁc projects, seasonal work, or for replacement of temporarily absent perma-
nent workers. After 1987, temporary contracts could be used more widely subject
to collective agreements specifying certain target groups. While the extended use
of temporary contracts allowed for more ﬂexibility in the labour market, these
contracts could only be renewed up to two times and could only have a maxi-
mum length of 15 months. Consequently, even though temporary contracts were
liberalized after this reform, the use of temporary contracts remained heavily
regulated in Italy compared to other countries.5
Soon after the 1987 reform, Law No. 108 was introduced in 1990 further
restricting dismissals for permanent contracts. In particular, this law introduced
costs for unfair dismissals of between 2.5 and 6 months pay for unfair dismissals
in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees. By contrast, unfair dismissal costs in ﬁrms
with more than 15 employees remained as before. This meant that, after 1990, the
3By contrast, payments for fair dismissals entail no cost to employers, as they are paid from
workers’ retained earnings.
4Boeri and Jimeno (2003) present a theoretical explanation of why these exemptions may
be in place to begin with. They argue that exempting small ﬁrms reduces the disemployment
eﬀect of dismissal costs because, in their model, smaller ﬁrms subject to dismissal costs have
to pay much higher eﬃciency wages to discourage shirking than larger ﬁrms.
5Note that, according to the OECD’s Employment Outlook (1999), Italy ranked ﬁrst in
terms of strictness of the regulation of ﬁxed-term contracts during the 1980s and it continued
to rank ﬁrst during the 1990s.
4cost of unfair dismissals for ﬁrms with less than 15 employees increased relative
to the costs for ﬁrms with more than 15 employees.6 By contrast, in 1997, Italy
moved again in the direction of trying to provide ﬁrms with a margin of ﬂexibility
by legalizing the use of temporary help agencies. While the 1990 reform increased
the costs of unfair dismissals for permanent contracts in ﬁrms with less than 15
employees relative to ﬁrms with more than 15 employees, the 1987 and 1997
reforms introduced ﬂexibility at the margin by deregulating the use of temporary
contracts and temporary lay-oﬀs. Since our data is for the period of 1986 to 1995,
in this paper we exploit the temporal change in dismissal costs generated by the
1990 reform for permanent workers, which applied diﬀerently for small and large
ﬁrms.7
3 Identiﬁcation Strategy
The goal of this paper is to identify the impact of dismissal costs on worker
and job ﬂows. In order to do so, we compare the change in the performance of
ﬁrms with less than 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform to the change
in the performance of ﬁrms with more than 15 employees. Since ﬁrm size may
be aﬀected by the reform itself, we deﬁne small ﬁrms as having less than 15
employees in all years before the reform and large ﬁrms as having more than 15
employees in all years before the reform.8
The strategy to identify the impact of the change in dismissal costs is illus-
trated in Figures 1-4. Figures 1 and 2 show accession and separation probabilities
in ﬁrms with less than 15 employees and ﬁrms with more than 15 employees for
the period 1986 to 1995. Figure 1 shows a sharper decline in accession probabili-
ties in small ﬁrms than in large ﬁrms, starting from 1991, i.e. right after the 1990
reform. Figure 2 shows a somewhat more pronounced decline in the separation
6In 1991, the Italian government also introduced other reforms. First, the government
introduced ﬁscal incentives by reducing payroll taxes (i.e., social security contributions) for ﬁrms
with more than 15 employees. However, as shown in Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003), while
an increase in dismissal costs should reduce both hiring and dismissals, a reduction in payroll
taxes should increase hiring but have no eﬀect on dismissals. Also, in 1991, the government
introduced a special procedure legislation allowing for collective dismissals (i.e. dismissals of
more than 5 employees within a range of 110 days) in ﬁrms with more than 15 employees. We
include in our sample only ﬁrms below 35 employees, who are less likely to be hit by a shock
large enough to cause lay-oﬀs of (more than) 5 employees. Finally, in 1992, the government
eliminated a wage indexation mechanism (Scala Mobile), which had been adopted in 1945, for
ﬁrms of all sizes.
7Since we focus on permanent workers in our empirical analysis, we are unlikely to capture
the eﬀect of the 1987 reform. Moreover, we also tried limiting the sample to the period from
1987 to 1995 to eliminate any possible eﬀect of the liberalization of temporary contracts in 1987
and our results are the same.
8We thus eliminate from the sample ﬁrms whose size crosses the 15 employee threshold
before the reform, so that we can focus on ﬁrms whose size is already at some “steady state”.
5probabilities in small relative to big ﬁrms starting in 1989, which suggests ﬁrms
may have anticipated the reform. Figure 3 shows a greater decrease in entry for
small relative to large ﬁrms after 1990, while ﬁgure 4 shows a larger increase in
exit rates for small than large ﬁrms at least until 1993.
3.1 Worker Flows: Accessions and Separations
To control for the possibility that reduced accessions and separations are the
result of changing characteristics of workers and ﬁrms in diﬀerent size categories,
we estimate the following linear probability model:
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where the dependent variable mijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if a match was created or destroyed, i.e., if there was either an accession or a
separation, between worker i and ﬁrm j at time t. The matrix Xijt includes: ﬁrm
characteristics, such as sector and region, and worker characteristics such as age,
occupation and gender. Postt is a dummy that takes the value of 1 after 1990
and zero otherwise. Sj is the yearly average ﬁrm size, and DS
j is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed in a small ﬁrm and 0 if the worker
is employed in a large ﬁrm. The interaction term between the small ﬁrm dummy
and the post-reform dummy captures the eﬀect of interest.
Comparing the periods before and after would control for the possibility that
changes in job reallocation in small relative to large ﬁrms after the post-reform
period were due to macro shocks, if small and large ﬁrms were aﬀected similarly
by macro shocks. It is possible, however, that the business cycle aﬀects small
and large ﬁrms diﬀerently. If this were the case, then we should have observed
both reduced accessions and increased separations during the post-reform period
due to the strong recession of 1992 and 1993. Instead, Figures 1 and 2 above
show both reduced accessions and separations. Nonetheless, to make sure we
control for diﬀerential cyclical eﬀects on ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes, we also estimate
the following alternative speciﬁcation:
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where Et is an expansion variable which is either a dummy taking the value of
1 during the recession years of 1992 and 1993 or the growth rate of GDP. The
size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀect is captured away by the interaction term between the
small ﬁrm dummy DS
j and the variable Et.
The introduction of dismissal costs should have a stronger eﬀect on more
volatile sectors, where these costs are likely to bind. To check whether the rise in
6dismissal costs after the reform had a greater eﬀect in small ﬁrms in more volatile
sectors, we estimate the following linear probability model:
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where Vk denotes the sectoral variance of employment growth during the pre-
reform period. The coeﬃcient γ3 captures the diﬀerential eﬀect of dismissal costs
on sectors with diﬀerent degrees of volatility.
3.2 Firms’ Employment Changes, Entry and Exit
To conﬁrm that the reductions in accessions and separations were due to the
reform and not simply to the fact that workers are churning more during the 1990s
for reasons unrelated to the reforms, we examine whether changes in permanent
employment fell in small relative to large ﬁrms, even after controlling for ﬁrm



















where Zjt is a vector which includes sector and region eﬀects, and sectoral pro-
ductivity in some speciﬁcations. Postt, Sj, DS
j are, as before, the post-reform
dummy, the yearly average ﬁrm size and the small ﬁrm dummy. Finally, ψj is a
ﬁrm eﬀect, where the regression is estimated with and without the ﬁrm eﬀect.
While the above regression captures the eﬀect of dismissal costs on the inter-
nal margin of adjustment, we are also interested on the eﬀects on the external
margins. In particular, we estimate the eﬀects of the 1990 reform on ﬁrms’ entry
and exit rates. We use the longitudinal information on ﬁrms to estimate the
following linear probability model:
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where the dependent variable ejt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if ﬁrm j enters or exits the market at time t. The vector Wjt includes sector and
region eﬀects. Postt, Sj, DS
j are as described above. As for the regression of
employment changes, we estimate this linear probability model with and without
ﬁrm eﬀects. Moreover, we extend the above speciﬁcations to control for size-
speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects (as in equation (2)) and to allow for diﬀerential eﬀects on
sectors with diﬀerent volatility (as in equation (3)).
74 Eﬀects of Dismissal Costs
4.1 Data Description
The data set is drawn from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS)
archives for the years 1986-1995. The original data set collects social security
forms of a 1/90 random sample of employees every year, with workers born on
the 10th of March, June, September, and December of every year being sampled.
The original archives only include information on private sector ﬁrms in the
manufacturing and service sectors, so that it excludes all workers in the public
sector and agriculture. We use a 10% random sample from this original data set.
The data set includes individual longitudinal records generated using social
security numbers. However, since the INPS collects information on private sector
employees for the purpose of computing retirement beneﬁts, employees are only
followed through their employment spells. The data does not follow individuals
who move into self-employment, the public sector, the agricultural sector, the
underground economy, unemployment, or retirement. The data set also includes
longitudinal records for ﬁrms employing the randomly selected workers in the
sample using the ﬁrms’ name, address, and social security and ﬁscal codes. While
the data set includes a random sample of workers, the probability that a ﬁrm is
selected increases with size. When using the panel of ﬁrms, we account for this
by weighting each observation by the probability that it appears in the sample,
which is given by the average number of employees divided by 90.
The data set is, thus, an employer-employee panel with information on workers
and ﬁrm characteristics. In particular, the data includes information on employ-
ees’ age, gender, occupation, dates of accession and separation with each ﬁrm,
and type of contract, and information on ﬁrms’ location, sector of employment,
number of employees, and ﬁrms’ dates of incorporation and termination. The
advantage of this administrative data for the purpose of studying the eﬀects of
dismissal costs on worker transitions and ﬁrms’ entry and exit probabilities is
that, contrary to survey data which measures transitions by matching quarterly
data and using tenure information to identify job changes, in our data we can
identify the exact dates of accessions and separations according to when social se-
curity contributions began and ended. Moreover, the exact dates of incorporation
and termination of the employing ﬁrm are recorded in the INPS archives.
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for men and women separately by
ﬁrm size, before and after the 1990 reform. Men’s accessions and separations de-
crease after 1990 in both small and large ﬁrms, but more in small ﬁrms. Similarly,
women’s accessions and separations fall more in small than in large ﬁrms, though
the eﬀect on separations is stronger. These simple comparisons of means suggest
that the Italian 1990 reform appears to have reduced accessions and separations
of both men and women.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on ﬁrms’ characteristics. In particular,
8this table shows that entry rates fell in small and large ﬁrms after the reform,
though the fall was more pronounced in small ﬁrms. On the other hand, exit rates
increased similarly both in small and large ﬁrms after the reform. Finally, the
volatility of employment (measured as the variance of employment) fell in small
ﬁrms, while it increased for large ﬁrms, after the reform. Though these simple
comparisons of means suggest that the increase in dismissal costs as a result of the
reform may have slowed down employment adjustments, some of these changes
could be due to changes in sectoral composition or location of small ﬁrms. The
following sections present results which control for covariates.
4.2 Eﬀects on Accessions
Table 4 reports marginal eﬀects of a linear probability model for accessions esti-
mated using equations (1)-(3). The dependent variable is a variable that takes
the value of 1 if the person joined a ﬁrm in a given year and zero otherwise. These
linear probability models are estimated using a sample of permanent workers and
of ﬁrms with less than 35 employees. The sample is restricted to ﬁrms with
less than 35 employees to increase comparability between the treatment group of
ﬁrms with less than 15 employees and the control group of ﬁrms with more than
15-employees.9
Panels A and B in Table 4 report results for men and women, including
controls for worker’s age and occupation, ﬁrm’s sector and location, ﬁrm size and
year eﬀects, as well as sector productivity, sector-speciﬁc trends and size-speciﬁc
cyclical eﬀects. The reported standard errors allow for clustering by period-size
group to control for common random eﬀects within these cells. Overall, the results
show a large and statistically signiﬁcant decline in permanent accessions in small
relative to large ﬁrms after the 1990 reform was introduced. Column (1) shows
that accession probabilities decreased by 0.019 or 8.2% for men and by 0.02 or
9.2% for women in small relative to big ﬁrms during the reform years. Including
sector-speciﬁc trends and sector productivity in Columns (2) and (3) leaves the
eﬀects on accession probabilities basically unchanged. Moreover, controlling for
size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects in Columns (4) and (5) reduces the eﬀect for men to
−0.01, while increasing the eﬀect for women to −0.026.10
Columns (6) reports results which include the third-level interaction of the
post-reform dummy, the small ﬁrm dummy and the volatility of employment
9Results are robust to changes in the 35 employees threshold.
10In some speciﬁcations we tried including worker eﬀects. The eﬀects are similar but less
precise. This is not surprising given that we loose many workers from the sample because
workers are not followed once moving out of the labour force, or to the underground economy.
At the same time, given that accessions and separations are moving in the same direction, it
is unlikely that changes in workers’ unobservable characteristics after 1990 are behind these
patterns. For example, if less-employable individuals look for work in small ﬁrms during the
1990s, this could explain the decrease in accessions in small ﬁrms after 1990, but it could not
explain the decrease in separations.
9growth, as described in equation (3).11 The results in this table show that the
probability of an accession falls drastically for workers employed in small ﬁrms
after the reform if they are employed in a highly volatile sector, where dismissal
costs are likely to bind. For example, accessions fall by 17% for men and by
38% for women in small relative to large ﬁrms in sectors where the variance of
employment is three standard deviations above the mean, but only by 6% for
men and 15% for women in sectors where the variance of employment is two
standard deviations above the mean. This conﬁrms that workers employed in
ﬁrms where dismissal costs are likely to bind appear to be most aﬀected the 1990
reform. This is reassuring since it conﬁrms that we are probably capturing the
eﬀect of the reform, rather than the eﬀect of some other contemporaneous shock
or legislative change that should not be aﬀect diﬀerently sectors with diﬀerent
volatilities.
4.3 Eﬀects on Separations
Table 5 reports marginal eﬀects of linear probability models for separations. The
dependent variable is now a variable that takes the value of 1 if the person
separated from the ﬁrm in a given year and zero otherwise. The controls in these
speciﬁcations are as in the linear probability models for accessions.
As before, Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for men and Panel B for
women. The results show that separation probabilities decreased for both men
and women. For example, the results from the basic speciﬁcation show a decrease
in separation probabilities of 0.029 or 9% for men and of 0.034 or 10.4% for
women. Controlling for sector-speciﬁc trends and sector productivity makes the
eﬀects for men slightly larger, but does not aﬀect the results for women. Results
controlling for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects suggest that the eﬀect of the reform is
even larger. In particular, separation probabilities now fall by 9.6% for men and
by 14.4% for women.
Results of speciﬁcations including the third-level interaction between the post-
reform dummy, the small ﬁrm dummy and the pre-reform volatility of employ-
ment growth are reported in Column (6). We do not ﬁnd a diﬀerential fall in
separations for men in highly volatile sectors. By contrast, the results for women
show that separations fall a lot more for women in small relative to large ﬁrms
in highly volatile sectors. For example, separations fall by 48% for women in
small relative to large ﬁrms in sectors where the employment variance is three
standard deviations above the mean, but only by 20% for women in sectors where
the employment variance is two standard deviations above the mean.12
11Also in this case, we have ran diﬀerent speciﬁcations (controlling for size-speciﬁc cyclical
eﬀects, sectoral productivity and individuals eﬀects) that we do not report for brevity, as the
results do not change.
12Again, adding controls for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects, sectoral productivity and individuals
eﬀects does not change the picture oﬀered by column (6).
104.4 Eﬀects on Employment Changes
We then analyse whether the increase in dismissal costs decreased employment
adjustments in the internal and external margins in small relative to large ﬁrms.
While the data set includes a random sample of workers, the probability that
a ﬁrm is selected increases with size. We account for this by weighting each
observation by the probability that the ﬁrm actually appears in the sample, which
is given by average number of employees divided by 90.13
To look at the eﬀects of dismissal costs on the internal margin, we regress the
absolute value of ﬁrms’ employment growth on the interaction between the post-
reform dummy and the small ﬁrm dummy, controlling for a number of covariates
including ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Table 6 reports results of speciﬁcations controlling
for diﬀerent covariates. All speciﬁcations show that the 1990 reform reduced
employment changes in small relative to large ﬁrms. The size of the reduction
seems large as the lowest estimates, which control for size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects
and ﬁrm eﬀects, implies a drop of 15% in the willingness to adjust employment.14
4.5 Eﬀects on Entry and Exit
To look at the eﬀects on the external margins, we estimate linear probability
models of entry and exit. Table 7 reports results from estimating equation (5).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm
entered (Panel A) or exited (Panel B) the market. As for employment changes,
we weight each observation by the probability that the ﬁrm appears in the sample
and adjust standard errors to allow for clustering by period-size group.
Panel A shows that the entry rate of small ﬁrms goes down relative to large
ﬁrms after the 1990 reform. This result is robust to the inclusion of sector pro-
ductivity, sector-speciﬁc trends, size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects, and ﬁrm eﬀects, and
the results range between a 10% and a 24% reduction. Moreover, the results in
Columns (7) and (8), which include a third level interaction with the variance
of employment, show that the reduction in entry rates is larger the greater the
employment volatility. For example, an increase in employment volatility of two
standard deviations decreases entry by as much as 30%, and an increase of three
standard deviations decreases entry by as much as 70%.
By contrast, Panel B shows that the exit rate of small ﬁrms increases relative
to large ﬁrms after the 1990 reform, where the results range between 18% and
50%. As for entry, the results are robust to the inclusion of sector trends, sector
13As for accessions and separations, only ﬁrms with no more than 35 workers are included
and the eﬀect of interest is captured by the interaction between the post-reform dummy and a
dummy for ﬁrms under 15 employees. Also in this case, the reported standard errors allow for
clustering by period-size group to control for common random eﬀects within these cells.
14The results do not change if the error term is assumed to follow auto-regressive processes
of order one or two.
11productivity, size-speciﬁc cyclical eﬀects, and ﬁrm eﬀects. This is consistent with
the theory (see, e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993), as a rise in dismissal costs
lowers the present value of the future stream of proﬁts, thus, leading to greater
exit. Moreover, given that closing ﬁrms are not subject to costs for unjust
dismissals, small ﬁrms subject to suﬃciently large shocks may close up the ﬁrm
and re-open in order to by-pass the regulation. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms in more volatile sectors. Columns (7) and (8) show
that the increase in the exit rates is larger the larger the employment volatility,
though the eﬀect becomes less precise when ﬁrm eﬀects are included.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present new evidence on the impact of dismissal costs on worker
and job ﬂows. We use an employer-employee panel from the Italian Social Security
to examine the eﬀects of dismissal costs on workers’ accessions and separations,
and on ﬁrms’ employment changes as well as entry and exit. We exploit the
fact that dismissal costs increased in Italy after the 1990 reform for ﬁrms with
less than 15 employees relative to larger ﬁrms. This reform allows to adopt a
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach that arguably helps to overcome identiﬁcation
problems in some of the studies that use cross-country variation and cross-sectoral
variation in dismissal costs within a country.
We ﬁnd that both accession and separation probabilities decreased for men
and women in small relative to large ﬁrms after the reforms. In particular, our
results imply a decrease of as much as 10% in accessions and separations. More-
over, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect is more pronounced in those sectors that were more
volatile before the reform, and where dismissal costs are likely to bind.
Aside from the eﬀect of the reform on worker ﬂows, we also ﬁnd that the
reform aﬀected employment adjustments on the internal and external margins.
On the internal margin, we ﬁnd that the reform reduced employment adjustments
by as much as 15%. On the external margin, our lower bound estimates suggest
that the rise in dismissal costs reduced entry by about 10% while increasing exits
by about 18%. In addition, as for worker ﬂows, we ﬁnd that these eﬀects appear
to be stronger in sectors whose pre-reform employment volatility was larger and
where dismissal costs are more likely to bind.
Overall, these results support the view that dismissal costs lower mobility by
reducing employment adjustments and ﬂows into and out of employment. At
the same time, we have examined the impact of dismissal costs on the external
margin of adjustment, which has hardly been looked at in previous studies, and
ﬁnd that while dismissal costs reduce entry, they also reduce ﬁrm survival.
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14A Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Yearly accession probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above 15
employees
Figure 2: Yearly separation probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above
15 employees)
15Figure 3: Yearly entry probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above 15
employees)
Figure 4: Yearly exit probabilities conditional on ﬁrm size (below/above 15 em-
ployees)
16Table 1: Men. Descriptive statistics by ﬁrm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
35.79 36.99 37.39 38.35
(11.32) (10.75) (11.24) (10.54)
0.81 0.81 0.76 0.74
(0.4) (0.39) (0.43) (0.44)
6.48 6.9 24.81 24.28
(3.98) (4.16) (5.72) (5.9)
0.23 0.19 0.17 0.16
(0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36)
0.32 0.26 0.24 0.21
(0.47) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41)
N 12321 12640 4822 5931
Small firms Large firms
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Accession rate
Separation rate
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to
1990, the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 2: Women. Descriptive statistics by ﬁrm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
32.18 34.05 32.44 34.18
(9.72) (9.4) (9.42) (9.1)
0.42 0.43 0.53 0.55
(0.49) (0.49) (0.5) (0.5)
6.32 6.58 24.75 23.75
(3.98) (4.16) (5.75) (5.8)
0.22 0.17 0.18 0.14
(0.42) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35)
0.32 0.24 0.26 0.22
(0.47) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41)
N 7228 6796 2452 2817
Accession rate
Separation rate
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to
1990, the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Large firms
Age
% of blue collars
Yearly average size of the firm
Small firms
17Table 3: Firms. Descriptive statistics by ﬁrm size, before and after the reform
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
0.050 0.045 0.028 0.027
(0.218) (0.206) (0.166) (0.163)
0.048 0.052 0.025 0.029
(0.213) (0.221) (0.157) (0.168)
6.073 6.475 25.027 24.129
(3.923) (4.141) (5.662) (5.861)
N 22207 22226 6921 8695
0.137 0.127 0.025 0.095
(0.096) (0.087) (.0153) (0.123)
N 50 50 49 49
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to 1990, the post-reform
period from 1991 to 1995. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Entry rate
Exit rate
Yearly average size of the firm
Variance of employment growth
Small firms Large firms
18Table 4: Eﬀects of the 1990 reform on accessions by gender
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.014 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 0.002
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023)
-0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.039 -0.068
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)* (0.02)**
-0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.012 -0.01 0.047
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.004)* (0.006)***
- - - - - -0.336
- - - - - (0.01)***
0.033 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.016 0.027
(0.02) (0.007) (0.01) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.053 0.07
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.028)*
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.027 -0.026 0.07
(0.002)*** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.007)** (0.002)***
- - - - - -0.515
- - - - - (0.016)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
A.  MEN - N = 35762
B.  WOMEN - N = 19276
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes




Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
19Table 5: Eﬀects of the 1990 reform on separations by gender
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.024 -0.045 -0.045 -0.039 -0.03 -0.037
(0.016) (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.01)** (0.008)** (0.012)**
-0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.02
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
-0.029 -0.031 -0.031 -0.026 -0.031 -0.021
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
- - - - - 0.028
- - - - - (0.017)
0.037 -0.032 -0.018 -0.021 -0.012 0.035
(0.015)* (0.008)** (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.059 0.12
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)** (0.031)**
-0.034 -0.035 -0.033 -0.04 -0.047 0.13
(0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
- - - - - -0.994
- - - - - (0.025)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO YES
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES NO
Recession dummy NO NO NO YES NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO YES NO
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Post 1990 
Notes: Only permanent workers and firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. All specifications control for sectoral and region effects, age,
occupation and total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral productivity which
is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the
base year. Columns (4), and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small dummy
with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while column (5)
interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. Column (6) includes interactions between the small firm dummy,
the post reform dummy and the pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10%
level.
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
B.  WOMEN - N = 19276
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Small firms
A.  MEN - N = 35762
20Table 6: Eﬀects of the 1990 reform on ﬁrms’ internal margin of adjustment
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.05 0.056 0.05 0.025 0.017 0.018
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.01) (0.011) (0.011)
0.166 0.169 0.169 0.075 0.075 0.07
(0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)***
-0.051 -0.057 -0.057 -0.032 -0.032 -0.029
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.01)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO NO
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES YES
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES YES
Recession dummy NO NO NO NO YES NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO NO YES
Firms fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. In panel A robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for
clustering by period/size. When possible, observations are weighted for the probability that a firms actually
enters the sample (given by the average number of employees/90). All specifications control for fixed sectoral
and region effects and for the total number of employees in the firm. Some specifications include sectoral
productivity which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers
using 1995 as the base year. Columns (5), and (6) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (5)
interacts the small dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0
otherwise, while columns (6) interacts the small dummy with GDP growth. *** Denotes significance at the 1%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Post 1990 × Small firms 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Absolute value of the growth rate of 
emplyoment - N = 41586
Post 1990 
Small firms
21Table 7: Eﬀects of the 1990 reform on ﬁrms’ entry and exit
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.008 0.009 0.01 0.019 0.014 0.01 0.004 0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.01) (0.007)
-0.066 -0.066 -0.066 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.113 -0.019
(0.023)* (0.023)* (0.023)* (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021)** (0.033)
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 0.035 0.026
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.006)** (0.004)*** (0.019)
------ -0.218 -0.216
------ (0.009)*** (0.113)*
0.007 0.008 0.008 -0.03 -0.032 -0.031 -0.001 -0.031
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.001) (0.007)***
-0.11 -0.109 -0.109 -0.031 -0.031 -0.029 -0.138 0.049
(0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.024)*** (0.034)
0.011 0.009 0.009 0.028 0.026 0.027 -0.012 0.015
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)** (0.02)
------ 0.183 0.076
------ (0.013)*** (0.116)
Sector and Region fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trend YES NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Sector specific trends NO YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Productivity NO NO YES YES YES YES NO YES
Recession dummy NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
GDP growth rate NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Firms fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES NO YES
A.  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ENTRY DUMMY - N = 60562
Post 1990 
Small firms
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
Notes: Only firms below 35 workers are included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size. When
possible, observations are weighted for the probability that a firms actually enters the sample (given by the average number of
employees/90). All specifications control for fixed sectoral and region effects and for the total number of employees in the firm. Some
specifications include sectoral productivity which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of
workers using 1995 as the base year. Columns (5), and (6) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (5) interacts the small
dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 1 for 1992-1993 and 0 otherwise, while columns (6) interacts the small
dummy with GDP growth. Columns (7) and (8) include interactions between the small firm dummy, the post reform dummy and the
pre-reform variance of employment growth by sector and size. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the
5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Post 1990×Small firms×Pre-reform
variance of empl. growth by sector
B.  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXIT DUMMY - N = 60562
Post 1990 
Small firms
22